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Abstract 
The field of Knowledge Management (KM) promises considerable benefits to organizations 
attempting to manage their intellectual resources, but it remains unclear exactly what it is 
that is being managed? Many authors claim that organizations must value “their” 
knowledge in order to develop and maintain a competitive advantage, in so doing making an 
assumption that there is such a thing as organizational knowledge. In this paper the notion of 
organizational knowledge will be examined from an autopoietic perspective. It will be argued 
that autopoietic theory as developed by Maturana and Varela (1980), offers a useful 
epistemological basis from which the idea of organizational knowledge may be considered 
and KM may develop as a discipline.   
Keywords 
Organizational knowledge, autopoietic theory, knowledge management 
1. Introduction 
Knowledge management, as a field of study, has suffered from issues of definition since 
before the term caught the attention of practicing managers and IS professionals.  Put simply, 
what is it that everyone is trying so hard to manage? Various perspectives and research 
approaches have developed according to the differing assumptions of the people involved.  
Typically, these different approaches may be conceptualized according to the epistemological 
and ontological assumptions of their proponents, i.e. ontologically knowledge may be seen as 
a characteristic of individual people, that (epistemologically) may be held like an object in a 
database, or conversely, it is a characteristic of an organization and best considered as a 
process.  When considered in this light, most approaches to KM fall into one of four broad 
categories according to the assumptions that underpin them (See figure 1 below). 




















Figure 1: Assumptions underpinning Knowledge Management Research. 
In this paper we will focus on the notion of organizational knowledge and attempt to clarify 
what exactly it might be.  In undertaking this discussion we will draw on Maturana and 
Varela’s (1980) autopoietic theory as an epistemological basis from which to build our 
discussion.  Autopoiesis is a biological systems theory and has significant implications for 
cognitive science and the way in which not only knowledge but also the nature of 
organizations may be considered.  Within the literature on autopoietic theory there has been 
considerable debate over the past 20 years regarding whether higher order entities, such as 
social systems may be considered to be autopoietic (see Zeleny & Hufford 1992, Luhmann 
1990, Robb 1992, Morgan 1997).  This debate stems from the temptation to attribute 
organizations with the same characteristics as other living systems.  As such, if organizations 
could be considered to have the same characteristics as autopoietic systems, then what 
implications would this have for the concept of organizational knowledge? 
The purpose of this paper is to apply the epistemology developed within autopoietic theory, 
to the discussion of organizational knowledge with a view to proposing an autopoietic view 
on the topic.  Furthermore the implications arising from this view of organizational 
knowledge will be explored in terms of attempting to ‘manage’ organizational knowledge.  
To achieve this, the next section provides a brief overview of autopoietic theory, this is 
followed by a discussion of the theory’s implications when considering the notion of an 
organization and furthermore the nature of characteristics of organizational knowledge.  
Lastly the paper will briefly examine some of the implications autopoietic theory may have 
for KM accepting the outcomes of the discussions in the previous sections. 
2. A Brief Overview of Autopoietic Theory  
Humberto Maturana and Francisco Varela’s (1980) theory of autopoiesis or self-production, was 
developed to provide explanations of the nature and characteristics of living systems.  Although it is 
not possible in this paper to fully describe the various concepts and processes that compose 
autopoietic theory, a brief description of the core concepts is provided here such that subsequent 
discussions on the nature of organizations and knowledge may be understood.  The central idea of 
autopoietic theory is that living systems are characterized by their self-production, technically 
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meaning that the components of the system, further produce the components of the system.  Based 
upon this premise autopoietic theory describes a number of rules and processes by which individuals 
interact with and ‘know’ their environments and through which their behaviours emerge. 
Within autopoietic theory, an individual’s behaviour is determined by particular states of nervous 
system activity (Maturana & Varela 1980), this activity is defined by what Maturana and Varela have 
described as operational closure, which presupposes that in all cases nervous system activity results 
from, and leads to, further nervous system activity in a closed cycle (Maturana & Varela 1980).  
Possible and actual changes in state of the nervous system are therefore defined by the nervous 
system’s structure and not external forces.  External or environmental forces may act as triggers for 
change but it is the nervous system’s structure that dictates which forces can be a trigger (Mingers 
1991).  Therefore changes to the structure of one person's nervous system, and consequently their 
behaviour, will be unique to that person.  The environmental perturbations that act as a change trigger 
in one person will not necessarily trigger a change in another, or if they do, the change that is 
triggered may take a different form and/or have different implications for the viability of that person 
in his/her environment, given his/her history. Although the nervous system is operationally closed it 
does not have a fixed structure, it is plastic, its structure changes over time and it is this quality that 
allows for changes in behaviour and subsequently what we describe as learning (Mingers 1991).  
Therefore as the nervous system’s structure changes, so too will the potential range of behaviours that 
its structural-determinacy makes possible. The ontogeny of a unity (or in the context of this paper, a 
person) denotes the history of structural change within that person (Maturana & Varela 1992).   
When considering the ontogeny of two people, the situation of structural change can be viewed from 
the perspective of either individual.  Depending on which unity is under study, the other simply 
becomes a component of the environment with which that unity is constantly interacting.  When these 
interactions become ‘recurrent’, autopoietic unities can become structurally coupled.  Hence, there is 
a history of recurrent interactions leading to a structural congruence between the two unities.  
Therefore, a unity is structurally coupled to its environment and vice versa.  Language is an example 
of higher-level structural coupling, or what Maturana and Varela would describe as a consensual 
domain.  Within a consensual domain two individuals would be able to observe the attribution of 
meaning to common events and experience that are very similar for both parties.  
This description of autopoietic theory should only be considered as a cursory introduction to some of 
the major concepts within the theory.  The significance of these ideas, however, becomes apparent 
when they are applied to the notions of knowledge and organizations, as they define the process by 
which the individual comes to know of their environment and orient themselves within it.  If 
Maturana and Varela’s ideas are accepted then the well accepted ways of understanding what 
knowledge management may involve (such as that presented in the work of Nonaka and Takeuchi 
(1995)) and in particular what organizational knowledge may be, require significant re-evaluation. 
3. Autopoietic Theory, Organizations & Knowledge 
In regard to organizational knowledge, autopoietic theory has a number of implications, 
however, the most significant relates to the nature of an organization, and whether it (as an 
entity) may be considered to have knowledge at all.  Within the literature on autopoietic 
theory there has been considerable debate over the past 20 years regarding whether higher 
order entities, such as social systems may be considered to be autopoietic (see Luhmann 
1990, Zeleny & Hufford 1992, Mingers 1995, Robb 1992, Morgan 1997).  A number of 
different approaches have been proposed, with none being completely satisfactory in terms of 
ontology, epistemology or application. Kay (2001) has summarised the different approaches 
into three broad streams of debate, termed Scientistic, Sociological & Metaphoric.  The 
Scientistic perspective is characterised by approaches seeking to show that social systems 
(including organizations) are (literally) autopoietic, as distinct from the metaphoric 
perspective where social systems may be viewed as if they were autopoietic.  The 
Sociological perspective, characterised by the work of German social theorist Niklas 
Luhmann, takes a different approach by using communications as the central component of 
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the system rather than people. For Luhmann, people constitute part of the environment of the 
social system that perturbs and triggers the communication.  Each of these views has been 
found to be problematic for different reasons, with none satisfactorily addressing issues 
relating to consistency with the original theory or utility in terms of providing practical 
guidance. 
The major problem in addressing these issues arises from the important distinction that 
humans exist in physical space whilst organizations are represented in non-physical space.  
Therefore although an individual may exhibit particular behaviours through which aspects of 
their knowledge may be assessed and furthermore have these behaviours distinguished in 
language, organizations are unable, as an entity, to distinguish anything, as they are a 
distinction themselves.  From an autopoietic perspective the ability of an organization to 
exhibit a particular behaviour, make a decision, or interact with its environment is nothing 
more than a description given by an observer, it does not represent an internal correlation of 
the organization as a system.  “The organization emerges as a distinction that describes the 
interlocking sets of behaviours between humans in the   physical space.  As such, the 
organization exists in a non-physical environment created by the individual, yet against 
which the individual orients their behaviour. The non-physical space exists as a function of 
the internal correlations of the nervous system.  For the individual, there is little difference 
between the way in which the physical environment triggers structure-determined changes 
and the way in which the non-physical environment triggers structure-determined change.  
The individual behaves as if the organization existed in physical space with physical 
characteristics.  In the context of the internal correlations of the nervous system, both are 
real” (Kay 2001, p. 474). 
This is significant as this position assumes that the organization is no longer a separate entity 
external to the individual, but rather an embodied aspect of the individual’s worldview.  As 
such an organization both influences and is influenced by the continuous functioning of 
internal correlations within the individual’s nervous system and not as an entity in the 
individual’s physical environment.  This particular epistemological stance is referred to by 
Maturana and Varela as objectivity-in-parentheses.  It is important to note that the process-
of-knowing for Maturana and Varela brings forth ‘a’ world not ‘the’ world.  Reality (whether 
physical or non-physical) is an embodied notion that cannot be separated from the living 
process of the individual.  Within Maturana and Varela’s conceptualization, the notions of 
doing, being and knowing are all bound into the single notion of knowledge and all of these 
notions are subject to structure-determined processes of change.  As a consequence of these 
relationships, knowledge may be considered as the range of potential behaviours that an 
individual may take part in at any particular point in time.  As the nervous system’s structure 
changes, so too will the potential range of behaviours that its structural-determinacy makes 
possible.  This is due to the plasticity of the nervous system (Maturana & Varela 1992).   
We will therefore argue that social systems themselves are not autopoietic, but that the 
processes described within autopoietic theory may be used to better understand the 
generative processes that give rise to organizations and other social collectives.  To this end a 
more useful conceptualisation would see organizations as sets of structurally coupled 
individuals who through ongoing interactions have developed a consensual domain of action 
and meaning attribution, based upon the distinction of their common histories. This outcome 
is important in terms of discussions relating to whether knowledge may be considered a 
quality of individuals or organizations.   
By arguing for a position where organizations, rather than considered as entities themselves 
are viewed as distinctions made by an observer, we have in essence argued for a view where 
knowledge is considered a quality of the individual, which may be observed to be a 
characteristic of an organization by an observer.  However, such observations are nothing 
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more than distinctions and are not indicative of something that may be quantified in a 
physical sense. As such it does not make sense to discuss organizational knowledge in similar 
terms to the way that knowledge is discussed with reference to individual people and their 
capabilities.  Notions such as useful, timely or meaningful are not innate characteristics of a 
piece of knowledge or information1 but rather observations that the practitioner makes about 
such knowledge or information.  These observations are a function of the practitioner or 
observer’s own particular cognitive structure that has developed over time through ongoing 
and recurrent interactions with the environment.  As such to describe an organization as 
having knowledge would be, from an autopoietic perspective, to suggest that a particular 
linguistic distinction were a knowledgeable entity, a position which does not make much 
sense, nor is particularly useful. 
Having argued that, strictly speaking, organizations are not knowledgeable entities, there remains a 
number of unexplained issues.  For example such a perspective would fail to account for the activities 
of organizations that arguably are the result of collective action by their members, actions that would 
be impossible for an individual to undertake and as such are arguably attributable to the organization 
or social group.  At a simple level, this could be illustrated by two people cooperating to lift and move 
a piece of furniture from one room to another without damaging it.  Neither individual could 
undertake the operation by themselves and as such the outcome is the result of a collective 
coordination of their respective capabilities.  Although this particular example could be explained in 
terms of the separate actions of each individual, such an approach is not scalable and quickly becomes 
too complicated to be of much practical value.  This issue becomes obvious where examples of high 
complexity such as those described by Weick and Roberts (1993) are concerned.   
Weick and Roberts examined the processes involved in the safe operation of flight decks on aircraft 
carriers arguing that organizations enact aggregate mental processes.  Central to their point of view 
are ideas drawn from Sandelands & Stablein (1987), Wegner, Erber and Raymond  (1991), and 
Hutchins (1990, 1991).  These authors argued for different approaches to the notion of group or 
collective mind, based upon metaphoric parallels between the human brain and organizations 
(Sandelands & Stablein 1987) leading to the assertion that intelligence may be found in patterns of 
behaviours rather than individual knowledge; degrees of cognitive interdependence between actors 
focused on memory processes (Wegner et al 1991) leading to the enaction of a single transactive 
memory system between individuals, and  that overlapping knowledge between individuals provides 
for redundant representation allowing people to take responsibility for all parts of the process to 
which they can make a contribution (Hutchins 1990).  Based upon these different views, Weick and 
Roberts proposed there own perspective on the notion of ‘collective mind’, where they paid “…more 
attention to the form of connections than the strength of connections and more attention to mind as 
activity than mind as entity” (1993, p. 360).  The distinction made here to mind as activity rather than 
entity is important as it emphasises the idea that the knowledge of the collective or organization is not 
an objective notion that may be ‘captured’, but that it does represent something distinct from the 
knowledge of the individual.  They note, “Our focus is at once on individuals and the collective, since 
only individuals can contribute to a collective mind, but a collective mind is distinct from an 
individual mind because it inheres in the pattern of interrelated activities among many people” 
(Weick & Roberts 1993, p. 360). 
Weick and Robert’s work carries a number of parallels with the autopoietic perspective under 
development in this paper.  Firstly, it does not assume that knowledge is a characteristic of an 
organization but at the same time admits that there is something distinct about the actions of 
collectives that cannot be accounted for in the knowledge of individuals, secondly it recognises the 
importance of interactions and activity in the development of coordinated behaviours, thirdly, it also 
provides a locus for considering the observation of organizational knowledge, through the distinction 
of patterns of behaviour exhibited by individuals.  Following on from these key assumptions, we 
would argue that, the concepts of structural coupling, and consensual domains described within 
                                                 
1 It is important to note that the authors do not use the words knowledge and information interchangeably here as they represent significantly 
different concepts. Rather that the processes by which they are identified by an observer are subject to the same processes and rules within 
autopoietic theory. 
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autopoietic theory provide a biological basis for considering organizational knowledge that is not 
based purely on metaphor, and does not require the reification of organizations or their knowledge.   
The related concepts of structural coupling and consensual domains provide an important bridge 
between the cognition of the individual and the patterned behaviours that are often described as 
organizational knowledge.  At an individual level through ongoing recurrent behaviours in a common 
context, two individuals may become structurally coupled.  This denotes a degree of structural 
congruence between the individuals involved, developed through their common experiences.  The 
gradual structural coupling of two or more individuals forms the basis for the development of 
consensual domains, where “...the domain of interactions specified through…..ontogenic structural 
coupling appears as a network of sequences of mutually triggering interlocked conducts…” 
(Maturana 1978, p. 47). Consensual domains (or the sets of interlocking behaviours) operate 
essentially as closed systems i.e. they are self-organising.  At the same time the consensual domain is 
open in terms of the individuals that produce the behaviour, therefore others can replace the 
component organisms so long as their structure is congruent with that of the already coupled 
organisms.  It should be noted that a consensual domain, as the term is being used here, does not 
denote a domain of consensus or agreement.  It specifically refers to a set of interlocking behaviours 
emerging from the process of structural coupling, these sets of behaviours may be described as 
coordinated behaviour.   
We would argue these concepts provide the basis for a description of not only collective activity 
based upon the aggregated behaviours of individuals, but also the apparent emergence of a distinct 
collective behaviour.  This is compatible with the perspective put forward by Weick and others in the 
sense that the behaviours have become the locus for study rather than knowledge of the individuals or 
groups.  It is also consistent with the ideas found in the work of Sandelands and Stablein (1987), 
Wegner et al (1991), and Hutchins, (1990, 1991), in the sense that the behaviours although, 
autonomously generated, are a function of the ongoing interactions of the people within the group and 
as such are overlapping and interdependent. An important distinction remains to be made, however, in 
regard to the use of patterns of behaviour, rather than individual knowledge and that is the effect of 
context.   
The significance of context becomes clear when one attempts to distinguish the difference between 
the patterns of behaviour observed in a group and those associated with a general crowd.   Weick, 
following Ryle (1949) approaches this problem by considering the mind as a disposition to act with 
heed.  “People act heedfully when they act more or less carefully, critically, consistently, 
purposefully, attentively, studiously, vigilantly, conscientiously, pertinaciously (Ryle 1949, p. 151).” 
(Weick 2001, p. 263).  Here Weick, Roberts and Ryle place value judgements upon the observed 
behaviours in order to support the idea that behaviours may be combined either intelligently or 
stupidly.  Weick and Roberts (1993) observe, “Heed is not a behaviour but refers to the way in which 
behaviours…are assembled. [Behaviour]…is called heedful, not so much because…[it]…involves 
action preceded by thought but because the behaviours patterned into the action …suggest to the 
observer qualities such as noticing, taking care, attending, applying one’s mind, [etc]…”.  As such in 
distinguishing between a crowd and an apparently purposeful group, Weick and Roberts argue for a 
position where the actions of the crowd are essentially lacking in the levels of heed one might observe 
for example in a football team attempting to shoot for goal.  Within Weick and Roberts 
conceptualisation, heedful interrelating between individuals creates the context for the collective mind 
to operate. 
From an autopoietic perspective, the notion of context is accounted for quite differently.  Maturana 
and Varela (1992) are quite clear when distinguishing the role of value judgments within their 
epistemology.  Put simply, they consider them to be nothing more than a distinction made by an 
observer, they do not form an innate characteristic of the object under study.  As such, to distinguish 
one group of people i.e. the football team, as purposeful in their actions, and another i.e. people just 
walking down the street, as purposeless, does not denote innate characteristics of the two groups, it is 
simply the point of view of the observer.  This is not to suggest that an individual’s observed 
behaviours have no effect on others. The triggering of structural changes may and does occur through 
the observation and distinction of those behaviours.  These descriptions become information in the 
environment of the individual.  The nature or characteristics of this information being both perturbed 
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by and a perturber of the individual’s structure.  Behaviours, therefore, become information when 
observed depending upon the context of the observer. 
Whitaker (1996) examines the notion of ‘context’ from a number of different perspectives, however, 
it is his discussions of context from an autopoietic perspective that are of interest here.  From an 
autopoietic perspective, ‘context’ becomes the process through which the individual relates to their 
environment, rather than a static object.  Whitaker, (1992) describes this process as ‘contexture’ - an 
interweaving of referentiality and signification.  The ‘context’ is not a function of the environment or 
the individual but the continuous process of structural coupling that occurs between the two, a 
position supported in the work of Uribe. “Observers know and create their environment through 
interactions with it.  This interaction involves an explicit or implicit prediction about the 
environment” (Uribe 1981, p. 51) 
The implication of the autopoietic perspective is that it is not useful to consider two individuals as 
being in the same ‘context’, even though for example they may be in the same room.  The room is the 
environment; the context is the process by which each individual relates to it.  As such action also 
forms an integral dimension of the context. “The observer sees as behaviour, or conduct the changing 
relations and interactions of the organism with its environment, which appear to him or her to be 
determined by sequences of changes of state of its nervous system” (Maturana 1978, p. 41) 
Knowledge, for Maturana and Varela, is therefore as contextually dependent as it is observer 
dependent.   
The development of a consensual domain between individuals therefore signifies a congruity of 
context.  This means that the process by which an individual is relating to their specific environment, 
has converged with that of other individuals as a function of the ongoing process of structural 
coupling. These congruencies produce sets of behaviours that are mutually triggering for the 
structurally coupled individuals. As such organizational knowledge exists through the development of 
consensual domains, domains that are enabled through the congruencies in the respective contexts of 
the individuals involved.        
4. Implications of Autopoiesis for Organizational 
Knowledge 
This view has significant implications, not only for the way in which we define and think 
about organizational knowledge, but also for the way in which we conceptualise Knowledge 
Management Systems (KMS).  Firstly, knowledge is not an object that may be captured, 
packaged, processed and distributed.  It is an embodied notion that implies a KMS by 
definition cannot possess or process knowledge – individual or organizational.  The best we 
can aim for is that the KMS may support actors’ processes of contexture. It becomes an 
additional medium through which interlocking behaviours may converge and the congruities 
of context, that give rise to consensual domains, develop.  This process is facilitated by actors 
accessing the information, held in the KMS.  The information helps to orient the actions of 
organizational members through the triggering of structure-determined changes in behaviour. 
A KMS only becomes useful, however, once a certain degree of congruity has been 
developed between its users.  It is this congruity that allows the users to relate, or attribute 
meaning to the information in a way that supports their interlocking behaviours and therefore 
the creation of what may be termed organizational knowledge.  Without a satisfactory level 
of congruity the information would likely be ignored or remain unrecognized.  Consequently 
significant focus must be drawn towards the patterns of interaction between members of an 
organization and the way in which these patterns may be supported to give rise to consensual 
domains. 
That organizational knowledge exists in the patterns of interlocking behaviours between 
members of a group or organization, rather than the individuals themselves, means that work 
practices and the process by which they evolve become the focus for study.  This is why the 
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degree of turnover in the number of group members becomes a critical issue.  Too high a 
staff-turnover, and the consensual domain which forms the basis of the organizational 
knowledge begins to break down.  The specific patterns of interlocking behaviours unique to 
each group take time to form, as they require ongoing interactions between members in order 
to develop the higher levels of structural coupling.  By the rapid change over of members, 
however, the original patterns of behaviour that could have been described as that particular 
group’s knowledge, will be lost and change to reflect the new mix of people within the 
group.  The change in patterns may or may not support the outcomes the organization’s 
leaders were after. 
Achieving changes in the organization’s knowledge may also be better informed through this 
view.  Understanding the process by which the patterns of behaviour emerge allows for more 
informed decision making in regard to the way in which the organization is structured and 
how the knowledge of individuals within the organization may be shared.  
5. Conclusion 
This paper was an attempt to apply autopoietic theory, to the notion of organizational 
knowledge with a view to proposing an autopoietic view on the topic.  The approach 
described requires a shift from considering organizational knowledge as an object entity, 
towards a distinction made in relation to the interlocking behaviours of participants in a 
social system.  This has significant implications for the way in which KMS are developed 
and implemented within organizations as it requires a shift in thinking from a view where 
knowledge is captured, stored and distributed by the KMS, to a view where the processes by 
which the interlocking behaviours that underpin an organization’s knowledge, may be 
supported and strengthened by the KMS, through the distribution of orientating information. 
There are many open questions, however. While the theoretical basis for an autopoietic view 
is presented here, considerable work remains to be done in terms of translating the concepts 
of structural coupling and consensual domains into practical solutions for the workplace. 
While these questions are of general interest for understanding organizations, they are of 
particular interest to IS. Namely, in IS we would be interested to explore the actual or 
potential role of IS (or IT) in these processes in practice. Such an understanding would help 
us develop and maintain KMS that deserve their name. 
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